Rebuilding Iraq

"We're Rebuilding Iraq"

If Dave Letterman says it, it gets a huge laugh. And, the context doesn't matter.

Let some half wit blog commenter say it, and oh my, it's a fact. Iraq has been rebuilt better than it ever was. Ever.

The General Accountability Office said about 4 percent of the Iraqi funds had been spent and could be traced.

Iraq's government has had trouble spending its own reconstruction budget. Iraq spent only 23% of its $6.2 billion capital budget in 2006 and had similar problems last year, Bowen's report says. Just how much was spent is in doubt; a White House report on progress in Iraq said 24% of the capital budget had been spent by last fall, while the Treasury Department put the figure at 14%, and the GAO said it was only 4.4%. (USATODAY, February 6, 2008.)

In an outside audit under UN resolution 1483, paragraphs 12 and 20, KPMG, the independent auditor said of the defacto Iraqi Treasurer, George Wolfe:

...was unable to acknowledge the fair presentation of the statement of
cash receipts and payments, the completeness of significant contracts
entered into by the DFI and responsibilities for the implementation and
operations of accounting and internal control systems, designed to
prevent and detect fraud and error.

Our efforts to rebuild Iraq did not use a double entry bookkeeping system. Instead, it used what that auditors called a single entry, cash-based, transaction list — $ 20 billion of petty cash.

Of that $20 billion, GOP cronies in Iraq disbursed $ 6 billion in $ 100 bills without attempting to "balance their checkbook," or do a simple cash reconciliation. They spent $6 billion and didn't even know how much they had spent or how much was left.

How is Iraq's government spending money today? The Prime Minister walks around giving away cash.

From the AP, July 12, 2008

BAGHDAD - It is a politician's dream: Handing out cold, hard cash to people on the street as they plead for help. Iraq's prime minister has been doing just that in recent weeks, doling out Iraqi dinars as an aide trails behind, keeping a tally.

The handouts by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and a handful of other top officials are authorized — as long as each goes no higher than about $8,000, and the same people don't get them twice. Aides say they are meant merely to ease the pain a bit, and are motivated by a belief that better conditions will lead to more security.

Hmm, if we did such a great job of rebuilding Iraq, why are the Saddam replacements walking around giving out as much as $8,000 per person in the streets? And, what exactly happened to the Americanized democracy that was being formed. A democracy which would be an example to all the Middle East. A Middle East that would be stabilized and pacified by a new wave of Americanized democracy. What happened? We're buying votes with cash, as much as $8,000 cash per person. With no person getting money twice.

There's a bureaucratic nightmare!

And, what has our heroic Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction been doing and saying? That man would be Stuart Bowen, the only man to have ever held the job since its creation on November 6, 2003.

The success of any post-conflict reconstruction effort depends in
great part upon effectively employing the U.S. government’s capacity
to deploy effi ciently and rapidly the means of relief and reconstruction:
services, materials, and their supporting systems. This requires
extant governmental contracting and procurement processes that are
well structured and optimized for use in contingency situations. As
this report reveals, the U.S. government was not systemically well-
poised to provide the kind of contracting and procurement support
needed at the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Pre-war relief and reconstruction planning for the Iraq endeavor
focused chiefly on preparing for humanitarian assistance and the
restoration of essential services. The contracting and procurement
efforts during that phase reflected this focus. After combat operations
ceased in April 2003 and the Iraqi government collapsed, the
shape of these efforts began to shift. The U.S. discovered that Iraq’s
infrastructure was in far worse condition than some pre-war assessments
had indicated. With that recognition came the realization
that reconstruction requirements in Iraq would be far greater than
originally anticipated.

Way to cover your backside, Stuart.

In February 2003, the Secretary of the Army directed USACE to
serve as the executive agent for the Iraqi oil restoration mission.
USACE then created Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) to manage
and operate this mission, with the contracting offi cer for USACE’s
Southwestern Division as the “contractor’s source of definitive
guidance.”

In late February 2003, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology (ASA-ALT) approved
USACE’s justification for a sole-source, emergency response contract
for Iraq’s oil sector. On March 8, 2003, USACE awarded this contract
to KBR for “an interim period as a bridge to a competitive contract,”
after receiving approval from the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.22 See supra p. 15. It justified issuing the IDIQ contract on a
sole-source basis because KBR was “the only company [that] could
immediately satisfy the requirements of the oil sector plan, considering
the imminence of potential hostilities.”23 USACE relied on
section 6.302.1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),24 which
allows sole-source awards whenever there is “only one responsible
source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.”

Yes, Stuart, we all now know that KBR was Dick Cheney's baby, Halliburton, under a different name and corporate structure. Where did the money go and how was it spent to rebuild Iraq's oil fields?

Iraq's oil infrastructure was damaged when ... took over. The ... effected selected repairs. But the IAMB found that .... had chosen not to repair the meters on the pipelines. The IAMB told the ... that they were concerned that the lack of metering made auditing Iraq's oil exports unreliable – making it impossible to detect fraud, deception or smuggling. The minutes of the IAMB meeting make clear that ... had assured the IAMB that they were in the process of repairing the meters – in bad faith. The .... authority came to an end with the meters unrepaired. Estimates of how much oil revenue was siphoned off during ... [that one year] ... go as high as $ 4 billion – comparable to the amount Saddam Hussein is suspected of stealing during the entire duration of the oil-for-food program.

Well, $4 billion here. $4 billion there. Sooner or later it might add up to real money.

But, how are things going now?

to be continued