The National Intelligence Estimate

There is this thing called the National Intelligence Estimate or NIE. The NIE has been getting a lot of press since 9/11. Without the horrid events of 9/11, most of us would not have ever cared about or known about any NIE.

The NIE should be a compilation of information from all the executive branch intelligence gathering organizations. Intelligence gathering needs that extra bit of emphasis. For each bit of information gathered, we can assume other bits escape our gathering methods. Our methods can be compared to dipping a small net in the ocean while keeping our feet dry. Even if we board a huge ship, our toes and feet remain dry while dipping the nets. Our nets are designed with technology as the main seine, not with human input from diplomats, agents, and professional analysts given priority.

With that technological priority, we might get a good statistical sampling but we have missed huge upheavals like the fall of the Soviet Empire, the invasion of Kuwait, and Osama's plan to use planes as human guided missiles.

So this intelligence estimate is very imperfect. It should be viewed only as a tool to test the performance of our intelligence gathering ability and how well we analyze raw data.

As we are bombarded with the various types of spin being placed on the NIE's information, we should take great care and caution ourselves that information from human beings is fallible.

Humans make huge mistakes. Governments make huge mistakes. Blaming those mistakes on a few just compounds the mistake. Mistakes like using estimates as facts compound past mistakes and perpetuate poor reasoning.

From the NIE:

"Where population displacements have led to significant sectarian separation," the NIE states, "conflict levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves." [Does that mean the statistics support the troops escalations or that mixed society has failed since the invasion?]

The broad compromises needed for reconciliation [in Irag] "are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments." Analysts offered no cause to believe that fundamental shift will occur. [Does that sound very much like we need more time for diplomacy to work? Or, send more troops now?]

For one opinion on how we are fighting for a military solution dependent upon a political solution, click this link for the Jay Bookman column in the AJC.